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ABSTRACT 
Reasonable for the Right Reasons 
Elliott Soifer 
In order for the Law of Peoples to be stable for the right reasons, Rawls must provide an 
unassailable explanation as to why decent hierarchical societies would adopt fair terms of 
cooperation and follow them willingly when what is reasonable for these societies and 
what is reasonable for liberal societies are arguably quite different. The reasonableness of 
hierarchical societies, where the internal design affords greater liberties and privileges for 
some over others, calls into question the moral commitments held by their representatives 
in the original position. In order for Rawls to validate the assumption of a commitment to 
equality for the representatives of hierarchical peoples, Rawls would have to assume that 
these representatives have a deep commitment to equality that supersedes all positions of 
privilege. The commitment to equality of these representatives in the original position is 
not a valid assumption and for this reason, the law of peoples is not stable for the right 
reasons and is in fact a modus vivendi. 
in 
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Rawls wrote the Law of Peoples in an attempt to identify the principles of justice 
that can regulate political relations among decent peoples. Two ideas motivated him to 
write the book. The first is that "the great evils of human history -unjust war and 
oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and 
poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder -follow from political injustice, with 
its cruelties and callousness." The other is that "once the gravest forms of political 
injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great 
evils will eventually disappear".1 His work outlines a political conception of how a just 
and stable international order, similar to but more general than the domestic version 
fashioned in Political Liberalism, can be developed out of acceptable liberal ideas. In 
essence, it is a globalized version of Rawls's domestic conception which set out to 
identify to structure a stable society around fair principles of cooperation. The intention 
was to complete the political theory of a liberal democratic culture be supplying the 
principles and foundation to shape its foreign policy. The broader implications are that 
these principles are to serve as the foundation of how "reasonable citizens and peoples 
might live together peaceably in a just world;" an ideal conception. 
This ideal conception is what Rawls refers to as a realistic Utopia which he 
explains "extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political 
1
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 7. 
2
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 10. 
3
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. vi. 
1 
possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to our political and social condition". A 
realistic Utopia is "a vision is of a perpetually peaceful cooperative international order, 
where liberal and decent peoples stand ready to pacify aggressive states, to secure core 
human rights, and to help struggling countries so long as they need assistance".5 He 
realizes that the actualization of such a world order will be difficult to achieve but 
explains that the 
.. .idea of a realistic Utopia reconciles us to our social world by showing us 
that a reasonably just constitutional democracy existing as a member of a 
reasonably just Society of Peoples is possible. It establishes that such a 
world can exist somewhere and at some time, but not that it must be, or 
will be. Still, one might feel that the possibility of such a liberal and 
decent political and social order is quite irrelevant, so long as this 
possibility is also not realized. While realization is, of course, not 
unimportant, I believe that the very possibility of such a social order can 
itself reconcile us to the social world. The possibility is not a mere logical 
possibility, but one that connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations 
of the social world. For so long as we believe for good reasons that a self-
sustaining and reasonably just political and social world both at home and 
abroad is possible, we can reasonably hope that we or others will 
someday, somewhere, achieve it; and we can then do something toward 
this achievement.6 
Although Rawls believes that liberal democracy is the vehicle that will enable us 
to realize our full potential, he also understands that this realization will have to happen 
gradually. He explains that the forceful democratization of non-liberal countries is no 
more appropriate than the imposition of one comprehensive conception of the good 
forces upon a liberal democratic society. Consequently, the best we can hope for now is 
an international cooperative that liberal and non-liberal peoples alike can endorse. His 
4
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 11. 
5
 "John Rawls" Stanford on line Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/ 
6
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 127-8. 
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attempt to outline such an international order that is something other than a modus 
vivendi, and whether he was successful in this, is a source of much debate. 
There are many concepts and ideas in the Law of Peoples that are thick with 
meaning but not comprehensively treated. Rawls draws on many of the concepts he had 
fleshed out in earlier writings. So I will first attempt to outline a brief overview of the 
main facets of the law of peoples and compare and contrast the similar ideas, concepts 
and assumptions in the domestic conception of the original position as it is found in A 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. I will then scrutinize some of the critical 
assumptions in greater detail, focusing particularly on the ideas surrounding the 
reasonableness and the assumption of equality of decent hierarchical peoples in the 
original position. I intend to examine the truthfulness of Rawls's critical assumption of a 
deep commitment to equality on the part of these hierarchical societies and the support it 
provides to a stable law of peoples. 
The Domestic Original Position 
John Rawls's book entitled The Law of Peoples describes a set of principles of 
justice called the law of peoples, fashioned to act as the foundation for international 
relations among a society of peoples. This society is made up of constitutional liberal 
democracies and non-liberal but decent governments. The foundation of the law of 
peoples is conceived first as a liberal foreign policy and then is broadened to include 
other "tolerable" forms of government. It is not intended to prescribe principles of justice 
for any society other than a constitutional liberal democracy, but it is intended to 
illustrate that the ideas and principles that act as the foundation of a liberal foreign policy 
3 
are also "reasonable from a decent non-liberal point of view." Rawls's develops the idea 
of justice for the law of peoples in a similar way to his previous conception of domestic 
conception of justice that he develops in A Theory of Justice and later modifies in 
Political Liberalism, namely, the social contract. 
Rawls conceives of the original position in A Theory of Justice as a process to 
identify the principles of fair cooperation as well as the benefits and burdens of society 
that would be selected in an unbiased setting. The original position is a thought 
experiment that is conceived to help explain why a certain set of principles of justice 
would be selected and once selected, why parties subject to the principles could 
conceivably contract to abide by them. The test of their acceptance is based on our 
considered judgments, or the moral evaluations that seem to us to be especially sound and 
o 
are intuitively regarded as basic facts with which any theory of justice must comply. It 
seeks to answer the fundamental question of what is the most appropriate form of justice 
in a democratic society that best captures the fair terms of social cooperation among 
citizens regarded as free and equal.9 
In other words, it is a hypothetical situation in which representatives of the society 
are invited to select the principles of justice that will form the basis of their political 
relationships and the foundation of the basic structure of society that will preserve and 
protect these principles. The parties to this situation are interested only in determining the 
terms of cooperation regarding the primary social goods such as rights and liberties, and 
7
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 9-10. 
8
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 17-18; Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) p. 8. 
9
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 3. 
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economic and social opportunities and power. The choices of these agents are subject to 
a "veil of ignorance" which shields them from morally irrelevant circumstances that 
would otherwise influence their decisions. All agents are assumed to be rational and 
reasonable actors pursuing their self-interests. Such circumstances would include 
characteristics like age, gender, religion, affluence, natural endowments, etc. Rawls 
reasons that once this knowledge of individual circumstance is removed from the process: 
...the persons in the original position [will] try to acknowledge principles 
which advance their system of ends as far as possible. They do this by 
attempting to win for themselves the highest index of primary social goods, 
since this enables them to promote their conception of the good most 
effectively whatever it turns out to be. The parties do not seek to confer 
benefits or to impose injuries on one another; they are not moved by affection 
or rancor. Nor do they try to gain relative to each other; they are not envious 
or vain. u 
In other words, the agents act rationally, looking out for their best interests, but 
reasonably; acknowledging the legitimate interests of others, their equals. 
The veil of ignorance plays a crucial role in this conception. By limiting the 
information the particular agent has about the type of people they are and represent, it 
constrains each party so the choice they make is made on equal footing with no one 
having any power or authority over others.12 The agents are asked to consider a variety of 
principles of justice. The ultimate goal of the original position is to illustrate that under 
and objective circumstances, the agents will prefer the following principles of justice: 
10
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 123. 
11
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 125. 
12
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 121. 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others (the Liberty 
Principles); 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
a. Reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, (the equality 
principles), and 
b. Attached to positions and offices open to all (the difference principle).1 
Consequently from these principles we can build the basic structure of society, the 
institutions that will embody and preserve and protect them. 
Rawls distinguishes between the reasonable and the rational. A person is rational 
when they pursue whatever is to their advantage. A person is reasonable when they 
believe the rules of cooperation should be fair, and they are willing to moderate the 
rational pursuit of their own interests out of respect for the equally legitimate aims of 
others. Reasonable people accept what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment, meaning 
that other reasonable people will uphold other conceptions of the good, although they 
may be conflicting to their own. Many of the people we disagree with in terms of 
comprehensive doctrines are reasonable, fair-minded, sincere, intelligent, well 
intentioned. They also have good reasons for believing as they do, even though we might 
not find these reasons compelling. This is not a situation that is temporary; it is a 
permanent feature of a liberal society. Furthermore, reasonable people will want to want 
to live in a society, under fair terms of cooperation, with other reasonable people like 
themselves.15 
In order to operate effectively under such conditions, people have to be tolerant of 
one another's differences. In other words, tolerant in the sense that people should be free 
13
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 53. 
14
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness (2001) p. 6-7. 
15
 Freeman, John Rawls - An Overview p. 32. 
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to pursue their individual conceptions of the good as long as that pursuit does not 
interfere with the duties and obligations or other requirements of justice. Reasonable 
peoples are more than tolerant of one another, they want to be able to coexist 
harmoniously under public policies they can mutually endorse despite their differences; 
and they want to be able to justify these public policies with reasons that other people can 
also recognize as reasonable and can willingly accept as well. But this difference of 
opinion could lead to conflict and, subsequently, to instability. 
The Importance of Stability 
The stability of the society, its ability to endure over time and re-establish itself 
after temporary disturbances, is paramount and a characteristic essential to a viable 
principle of justice. There are circumstances were the stability may be temporarily 
affected, like in cases of national emergency, but the ability of society to regain the 
composure it once enjoyed after the temporary disturbance had passed is an important 
part of its stability. If the set of basic structures (political, economic and social 
institutions) of a well ordered society that embodies a given set of principles of justice 
was fundamentally unstable, the principles would need to be revised or abandoned.19 
Unstable societies would not be able to preserve these rights, liberties and opportunities. 
Consequently, it would necessitate the revision of the set of principles. 
Rawls spends considerable time outlining the needs and requirements of stability 
in his domestic conception of justice. The problem of stability arises in part due to the 
16
 Nagel, Rawls and Liberalism p. 73. 
17
 Freeman, John Rawls -An Overview p. 33. 
18
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 398-401. 
19
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 400-401. 
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fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls tells us in Political Liberalism that the problem of 
political liberalism is answering the question of how it is possible "that there may exist 
over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by 
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines." 
As a practical solution, stability could be maintained through the use of force. An 
official comprehensive doctrine could be imposed, or society could be organized around 
a single conception of the good, eliminating the instability that may arise from the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. However, this kind of stability is for the wrong reasons. Citizens 
have no reason to accept those principles except through fear of non-conformity. Stability 
must exist for the right reasons. 
Stability for the right reasons at the domestic level involves conformity to and 
acceptance of the principles of justice wholeheartedly.21 At the domestic level, the right 
kind of stability involves a level of moral justification for the basic structure of society. A 
basic feature of a liberal democracy is the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, or conceptions of the good life -religious, philosophical and 
moral -is the normal result of its culture of basic rights and freedoms. This is reasonable 
pluralism. In a well ordered society, a person's sense of justice is constantly reinforced. 
Reasonable pluralism is a concept that stems from the fact that a plurality of 
conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrine, or conception of the good life -religious, 
philosophical, and moral -is the normal result and a permanent feature of a liberal 
democratic culture.22 These conflicting reasonable doctrines are irreconcilable because 
everyone is subject to the same burdens of judgment and each of us can come to a 
20
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xviii. 
21
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. xvi-xx. 
22
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 36. 
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different, yet equally reasonable conclusion based on our interpretation of the same 
information and experience. For example, liberalism exists as a comprehensive doctrine, 
just as can libertarianism, anarchism, socialism, communism, communitarianism etc. 
They are all incompatible as comprehensive doctrines but can coexist peacefully in a 
politically liberal democratic society as long as they are tolerant of one another, meaning 
they do not violate the public political rights of others and accept liberal principles as the 
compulsory rules in the political sphere.23 This pluralism is reasonable if it is compatible 
with the fundamental basis for a democratic society. In other words, it is in accordance 
with the belief that we are all free and equal citizens participating in a society under the 
fair rules of cooperation. 
The agreement in the original position is based on the collective acceptability of a 
conception of justice among the participants. Rawls writes: "Now the reason for invoking 
the concept of a contract in the original position lies in its correspondence with the 
features of a well-ordered society. These features require, for example, that everyone 
accepts, and knows that the others accept, the same principles of justice."25 Thus there is 
a requirement that the principles of justice agreed to in the original position must remain 
stable under the conditions of a well-ordered society. The importance of this is paramount 
for it provides a way of testing the harmony of the conception of justice with the 
psychological and social basis of our moral sentiments.26 
Stability here is not simply a balance of power. It is the unfettered, rational and 
conscious choice of principles that will endure within a well-ordered society. The 
23
 Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus (1989) p. 237. 
24
 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. xviii. 
25
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 250. 
26
 Freeman, John Rawls - An Overview p. 21. 
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stability of North Korea is not an example of the stability in question because not only is 
the result divorced from unfettered conscious choice, but North Korea is not a well-
ordered society -its citizens do not have a corresponding sense of justice and a desire to 
help maintain it. As mentioned above, the stability of a society is greater when people are 
more willing to observe its prescriptions. The stability that Rawls refers to in A Theory of 
Justice is one resulting from our moral sensibilities and sense of justice. 
Rawls recognizes that the foundation of a conception of justice requires 
grounding in moral psychology and the human good. Stability for Rawls is based on both 
publicity conditions and a citizen's sense of self-respect. He introduces these two pillars 
of stability to delineate the difference between justice as fairness and the competing 
position of utilitarianism. The demands of public knowledge of the principles of justice, 
namely that a well-ordered society would appeal to these principles for determining 
which laws are just and what the corresponding nature of the basic structure of society 
should be in the distribution of benefits and burdens -help the worst off in society to 
accept their situation. By contrast, under the utilitarian principle of the greatest aggregate 
good, Rawls explains that it is beyond human nature for the least advantaged in society to 
accept that their interests are being sacrificed for the greater aggregate utility. Thus under 
this condition of publicity, justice as fairness is more stable.28 
Additionally, the requirement of publicity contributes to the increased sense of 
self-respect of a citizen under Rawls's conception of justice as compared to the utilitarian 
conception.29 It does so by offering transparency of the justification of the laws that 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 398. 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness (2001), p. 74. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 156. 
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govern, and as a result, treat citizens as responsible agents. Citizens then have 
knowledge of the rules that govern their social and economic relations and can plan their 
lives accordingly. The rules of the game are constant; whereas conceivably the rules may 
shift under utilitarianism if it is beneficial in the aggregate. The result of responsibility 
arising from public knowledge and transparency of the principles that govern society is 
increased self-respect. 
Self respect is also of principal importance in Rawls's conception of human moral 
motivation, that is, the sense of justice and the motivation to act upon it. It is one of the 
most essential primary goods because it gives the citizen a sense of their own value and 
confidence to act. Consequently, the parties to the original position will choose the 
principles of justice to ensure their self-respect. 
Justice as fairness engenders self-respect because it ensures the status of the 
participants as equals by publicly ensuring that the social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and offer fair 
and equal opportunity.31 Rawls claims that under his conception of justice, there are no 
second class citizens. Its principles ensure the independence of all citizens and free them 
from the economic dependency of those more advantaged.32 Thus, on a fundamental 
level, citizens interact as equals. Therefore, Rawls supports the choice of his principles of 
justice with citizens' moral motivation of being treated equally and nurturing a sense of 
self-respect which in turn generates a stable society. 
Freeman, John Rawls - An Overview p. 23. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 478. 
Freeman, John Rawls-An Overview p. 23. 
Cohen, Democratic Equality p. 734. 
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The benefits of a just society are evident; what is less evident is how such a 
society is possible (read stable) given social and economic constraints and human nature. 
Rawls's approach is twofold. He first explains how citizens develop a sense of justice, 
and how this sense contributes to stability. A sense of justice is the capacity for someone 
to be committed to the principles of justice and to willingly choose to act in accordance 
with those principles.34 He argues that we are inclined naturally to develop sincere 
affection toward our community and the people in it, as well as the basic structure of 
society that allows these things, and ourselves, to thrive. According to Rawls, there are 
three principles of reciprocity that explain this affection. In essence, they are principles 
that explain that the sense of justice is a reflection of our natural sentiments and is a 
natural part of being human. The key assumption is that citizens are more willing to 
maintain just institutions that benefit them and their loved ones and will incorporate this 
desire into their conception of the good. 
Rawls then outlines how this willingness to be just for the sake of justice fits into 
the idea of human flourishing. If it does not, and to have a sense of justice actually 
undermines our conception of the good life, then inevitably it will lead to instability. 
Rawls borrows from Aristotle in his explanation of the good. The good is defined as the 
deliberate and rational desires of someone assuming that the person has critically 
reflected on all of the various possibilities open to him or her. 
Thus the good of someone is delineated in terms of the type of life a person would 
choose if he or she were of sound judgment and sober thought. It can be understood as 
34
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 415. 
35
 Freeman, John Rawls - An Overview p. 24. 
36
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 429-430. 
Freeman, Congruence and the Good of Justice p. 307. 
38
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 366. 
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appealing to at least four types of goods that are of value to every human being: the 
realization of a person's capacities or abilities, autonomy, community and self respect. In 
other words, people are not simply slaves to passion and sensation, but derive a deeper 
more profoundly satisfying enjoyment the closer they come to the realization of their full 
potential.39 This claim is known as the Congruence Argument. 
Rawls concludes that justice as fairness is congruent with human flourishing, that 
is that there is congruence between citizens's understanding of justice and what they 
value. Of the four "intermediate goods" Rawls argues each is shown to be compatible 
with justice as it is derived from the original position. Regarding autonomy, a well-
ordered society affirms a person's autonomy and supports their considered judgments. 
Regarding community, a well ordered society is found to be itself a form of social union, 
in fact it is 
"a social union of social unions," marked by the shared purpose or "common aim of 
cooperating together to realize their own and another's nature in ways allowed by the 
principles of justice." 40 Regarding the unity of the self, it is manifest in the consistency 
of his rational life's plan with his or her sense of right and justice.*1 It follows that the 
more reasonable principles of justice derived from the original position are also those that 
would derive from the rational deliberation of the individual. They would be congruent. 
Thus, in a well ordered society, a sense of justice is also a good for the individual who 
has it. Furthermore, the congruence between justice and goodness supports the claim that 
individual citizens will wholeheartedly accept the principles of justice as fairness. 
39
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 364. 
40
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 456. 
41
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 491. 
13 
The Importance of Morality and Equality 
Rawls employs a Kantian constructivist approach. By definition, as a 
constructivist, Rawls does not believe that moral facts and truths exist independently and 
a priori to moral reasoning. However, he does not go so far as to deny that moral 
statements have a kind of truth within the realm of moral theory; he simply believes that 
it is not possible to intuit or discover their truth independently. As a Kantian 
constructivist, he begins from a conception of free and equal moral persons who are 
reasonable and rational. Borrowing some of the ideas of Kant's categorical imperative, 
Rawls begins with the original position. These participants all reach the same rational and 
reasonable conclusion, in this case the principles of justice, and in this way, Rawls's 
conception of justice is a result of a construction or agreement that originated with a 
conception of the person.42 This approach supports the claims of moral autonomy, 
without which the efficacy of the original position would be severely compromised. For it 
is the assumptions of rationality and reasonableness of the parties and the practical reason 
they employ, that render the objective status of the principles of justice that are the result 
of the deliberations in the original position.43 
It is this assumption of moral autonomy, and as a result of our ability to employ 
practical reason, that provides the foundation for several of Rawls's important concepts. 
The concept of autonomy as self-realization: " Properly understood, then, the desire to act 
justly derives in part from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely 
Freeman, John Rawls -An Overview p. 27. 
43
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 511. Also see Nielsen Liberal Reasonability as a Critical Tool 
(1998), p. 743. 
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free and equal rational beings with a liberty to choose" ; and the relation of acting justly 
to self realization: "...acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal rational 
beings.. .the desire to act justly and the desire to express our nature as free moral persons 
turn out to specify what is practically speaking the same desire." 
However, moral autonomy serves only as a starting point for Rawls' conception 
of justice. Justice has a more functional role in that it provides a means of justifying the 
basic structure of society in light of competing and conflicting comprehensive doctrines. 
The principles of justice are an impartial starting point for the resolution of conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines.46 They are part of the few common points that all citizens of a 
liberal society, despite their different beliefs, can agree on. 
Nevertheless, there may be irreconcilable differences in the justification and 
nature of the truth of the principles of justice in a well ordered society. Samuel Freeman 
provides the following example. Suppose a devout Catholic recognizes the principles of 
justice as fairness but sees them as natural laws. Accordingly, he or she would believe 
these principles to be divine decrees and self evident truths, capable of discovery with the 
aid of God. This belief contradicts Rawls's contention that the principles of justice are the 
result of practical reason -Kantian Constructivism. 
Furthermore, by rejecting that the principles of justice are the result of practical 
reason, the devout Catholic also rejects the notion of moral autonomy that supports the 
congruence argument -that justice is rationally good for all members of society. This 
good originates in the sense of justice and the concomitant desire to fulfill our nature as 
free and equal persons. The devout Catholic does so by denying that the desire for justice 
44
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p.225. 
45
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p.50J. 
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 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 329. 
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is a result of our desire for self realization, and claims instead that it springs from a desire 
to do God's will. Furthermore, the idea of moral autonomy as expressed by Rawls has the 
blasphemous origin in the conceit of human reason.47 
Thus this seemingly innocuous difference in the justification and nature of the 
truth of the principles of justice takes on a more disturbing role. Freeman's example 
points to the possibility of such citizens that may sanction the basic structure of society, 
but will not consent to the political justification. As a result, the public conception of 
justice would lie at odds with the private conception of justice as it exists in 
comprehensive doctrines and stability is no longer assured. It may even undermine these 
same citizens support of the basic structure of society by underscoring the disparity 
between the free thinking lay and there more constrained religious brethren. This 
conflict is part of the criticism that enticed Rawls into claiming he should develop a more 
practicable solution in Political Liberalism. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls dispenses with the claim that moral autonomy is 
one of the ultimate rational goods in a well ordered society and with it the congruence 
argument. Nevertheless he still holds that justice as fairness can provide a common basis 
for justification. He does so by making certain adjustments to address criticism like the 
one above and allows for the "correct" moral judgments from an objective point of view. 
The reason he does so is evidently because it is possible to conceive of conflicting 
reasonable comprehensive views that may lead to an identical conception of justice. 48 
Additionally, Rawls finds it necessary to adjust his conception of the person as a 
free, equal, reasonable and rational being. Just as the conception of justice is refined to a 
47
 Freeman, John Rawls - An Overview p. 29. 
48
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 356. 
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political doctrine from a comprehensive doctrine, so is the conception of the person. 
Morality is no longer founded on the conceptions of moral agency and practical reason. It 
is filtered to a political conception divorced from any particular comprehensive doctrine 
but is firmly committed to the principles of democracy. 
This filtering is the result of the problem of stability. If we can't easily agree on a 
comprehensive doctrine even in the most ideal of conditions, then not only is the stability 
of justice as fairness compromised, but it seems increasingly unlikely that any general 
agreement can be reached in a well-ordered liberal society. As Freeman points out: 
Liberalism on the basis of Rawls's account involves an ideal of mutual 
respect and reciprocity among free and equal citizens and their toleration of 
one another's diverse reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral views. 
If free and equal citizens cannot agree on a conception of justice to regulate 
their relations and serve as a basis for public argument, criticism and 
agreement, then inevitably coercive force will have to be applied to 
reasonable persons for reasons which they cannot reasonably accept. This, 
in an important regard, would be a denial of their freedom.50 
Thus Rawls's original idea seems unrealistically Utopian. Thus the intent of Political 
Liberalism was to address the concern that it was not possible to conceive of a just and 
stable society among reasonable people with conflicting comprehensive doctrines. In 
order to do so, Rawls develops three ideas: a political conception of justice filtered from 
the conflicting comprehensive doctrines, an overlapping consensus on the conception of 
justice, and the idea of public reason. These three ideas provide the foundation of a well 
ordered society that is stable for the right reasons. 
The stability of justice can be assured only if the principles of justice derived 
within the political conception can be shown to be an element in an overlapping 
49
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consensus of reasonable comprehensive views. By preventing the parties to know the 
comprehensive doctrines of one another, shading them by the veil of ignorance, Rawls's 
intent is to identify the political conception that can be viewed as a "system of fair 
cooperation among free and equal citizens" who accept the publicly recognized principles 
of justice that support that system.51 In other words, his goal is to identify a conception of 
justice, at the public level, despite the fact that the society is made up of a diversity of 
fundamental conceptions of the good, all of them completely reasonable. This also 
remained Rawls's fundamental goal for the Law of Peoples. 
The International Conception of the Original Position 
Similarly, the law of peoples is conceived through two international original 
positions. Rawls first creates an ideal theory of international relations among liberal 
democratic societies and then broadens the resulting theory to include non-liberal decent 
peoples in what he calls a "non-ideal theory". The principles that result from this two step 
process are to form the foundation of international relations among decent peoples.52 
In the first instance, only agents from liberal democratic societies working out of 
a liberal conception of justice are represented.53 These agents are rational in that they 
intend to choose the best principles that ensure the availability of the primary goods to 
satisfy the basic needs of their constituents. Primary goods are "things which a rational 
51
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man wants whatever else he wants" ; and they include rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social basis of self respect. Furthermore, 
rational men and women prefer more primary goods than less.55 
A veil of ignorance similar to the one in the domestic situation is in place to 
constrain whatever biases may exist and prevent the agents from making inappropriate 
decisions, so that they may uninhibitedly represent the constituents as free and equal 
persons. The resulting agreement is predictable given that all agents at this stage are from 
liberal democratic societies, although some critics have charged that peoples from liberal 
democratic backgrounds would have actually agreed to principles more closely mirrored 
to liberal ideals.56 
In the second instance, agents from non-liberal but decent societies are 
represented. Both types of representatives within this conception are similar in that they 
share the characteristics of respecting the self-governance and independence of other 
peoples and they do not have an aggressive foreign policy. Rawls concludes that the 
results of both processes are alike. Rawls believes that absent the size and strength of 
natural endowments and economic development of their societies, both original positions 
at the international level would result in the following eight principles: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are 
to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defence. 
6. Peoples are to honour human rights. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 79. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), p. 13. 
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7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime. 
In other words, they would select principles that would enable them to protect the rights 
and freedoms, as well as ensure their right to self-determination, and fair dealings with 
other societies including the right to wage a defensive war. The representatives to these 
original positions are very different than the first instance where the agents were chosen 
to represent other individuals, as was the case in A Theory of Justice. In this case, they 
represent "peoples". 
In order to understand what Rawls means by peoples, he identifies five types of 
domestic societies. First, reasonable liberal peoples, who possess three basic features; 
namely democratic constitutional regimes that recognize and protect certain fundamental 
rights and liberties for all citizens equally, a shared attitude towards justice, and a certain 
moral character that allows citizens to interact rationally according to the basic structure 
of the society and reasonably with fairness in their mutual dealings.57 
The second category is that of decent peoples. The basic structure of these non-
liberal decent peoples is one of a consultation hierarchy, but Rawls allows for some room 
for decent societies that may be otherwise structured.58 These societies are usually 
organized around a common conception of the good, a comprehensive doctrine. 
Examples include a religion, ethnicity or some type of caste system that in essence 
trumps the fact of reasonable pluralism or the basic equality of citizens. As a result the 
basic structure privileges members of the official religion above others but that protects 
57
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those of other faiths from persecution and respects a limited number of basic human 
rights. Basic human rights include the right to life, (subsistence and security), liberty 
(freedom from arbitrary arrest, slavery, serfdom and a sufficient freedom of religion and 
thought; to personal property; and to fair and equal treatment before the law.59 
Furthermore, as Rawls describes them, these societies must have a common idea 
of justice from which members of the society derive their feeling of duty and obligation 
to adhere to its principles and upon which their legal system is based. This feeling of duty 
arises from a sense of right and wrong as understood in that particular society. Similarly, 
Rawls explains that for a given system of law to be upheld, the administrators of justice 
must "sincerely and reasonably believe" this common idea of justice. It does not matter 
that this common idea does not reflect the belief that all individuals are free and equal, 
only that they are cooperating members of society, recognizing their moral duties and 
obligations as members of the society. This means that the various minorities (or non-
power-wielding majorities) are represented in the legal system and their opinions are 
considered, but their interests are not necessarily given the same weight or may be 
ultimately rejected, when public policy is determined. The ruling members however do 
justify their laws to these groups, but differently -some only get consulted. Finally, these 
decent non-liberal societies do not harbour belligerent foreign policy aspirations and 
respect the self-determination of other decent societies. ' 
There are three other types of peoples that are not included in the category of 
"well ordered" peoples and as a result to not warrant admittance to the Society of 
Peoples. These are: Outlaw States which refuse to comply with a reasonable law of 
59
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peoples; Burdened Societies, which are subject to unfavourable conditions of social, 
economic and historical circumstances that make the achievement of a well ordered 
regime, either liberal or decent, extremely difficult; and finally Benevolent Absolutisms 
which honour human rights but do not allow for meaningful political participation. 
From the first two types of domestic societies, Rawls creates the category of a "well-
ordered peoples" which comprise the society of peoples. 
The Society of Peoples 
The most striking difference between the domestic conception of the principles of 
justice and the international conception is the employment of a "people" as the main actor 
in the original position of the international conception. A people is classified by three 
basic features. First, it is organized under a reasonably just government that furthers their 
fundamental interests; second, it is united by common sympathies like a shared historical 
or political consciousness and/or common language so that any combination thereof 
predisposes them to desire to be governed uniformly; and third, it possesses a certain 
moral character that underscores their rational conduct under a shared conception of what 
is deemed fair terms of cooperation with other citizens.63 
The law of peoples is the fundamental terms of cooperation for the society of 
peoples. It lays out the duties and obligations for fair dealing among liberal and decent 
peoples. The institutional structure of the society of peoples does not include a form of 
world government like a unified political regime with legal powers and monopoly of 
62
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force that is normally exercised by central governments. Such a structure is prone to 
abuse and most likely to be reduced either to despotism or a weak union marked by civil 
strife as subjugated peoples fight to gain a modicum of freedom and autonomy.64 
According to Rawls, a society of peoples shares many of the same characteristics 
as a society of citizens?5 It is realistic and workable in the same sense as the domestic 
case; meaning that it is organized among reasonable and just societies and applicable to 
ongoing political relationships. Peoples are politically independent and equally entitled to 
respect, just as are citizens in a liberal democratic society. It is Utopian in the sense that it 
specifies the reasonable and just social and political arrangements for the society of 
peoples. Peoples are reasonable in that they will deal with each other fairly. It is a 
political conception, meaning that at the level of interaction, all of the "non-essential" 
characteristics of those societies that may hinder the establishment of a relationship 
among peoples are removed from the mindset of those actors party to the arrangement. 
As a result, they will not try to impose their interests on other peoples within the society 
of peoples. 
Furthermore, a society of peoples is tolerant. By extending the conception of 
justice from the liberal democracy to the Society of Peoples, there are many more 
varieties of comprehensive doctrines than those that exist within a single people. As a 
result, in order for the political conception to work, all public dealings must be imbued 
with toleration.66 
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Not all societies are considered as peoples. As Charles Beitz points out, although 
both nations and peoples share many of the same characteristics like common sympathies 
and a moral nature, nations have a necessary historical and cultural element; "a nation's 
unity is thought to be based on a common language and history, ethnic or racial 
uniformity, probably a common religion, and so forth." Rawls however does not regard 
the origin of a peoples common sympathies as paramount. He writes that "the law of 
peoples starts with the need for common sympathies, no matter what their source may be. 
My hope is that, if we begin in this simplified way, we can work out political principles 
that will, in due course, enable us to deal with more difficult cases where all the citizens 
are not united by a common language and share historical memories".68 
The Pragmatism of Peoples 
Ultimately Rawls's decision to use peoples rather than individuals and states was 
pragmatic. 9 It was compelled by a realistic view of current international politics. He 
explains that the law of peoples is realistic in the sense that "it is workable and may be 
applied to ongoing cooperative political arrangements and relations between people."7 
Rawls explains that if he used the individual rather than peoples as primary it would 
inevitably result in the conclusion that only a liberal democratic society is acceptable.71 
political power to suppress reasonable comprehensive doctrines other than one's own. Political Liberalism 
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Furthermore, Rawls chooses the idea of a peoples over the more familiar notions 
of a state or nation for a variety of reasons. According to Rawls, governments are a 
construction meant to serve the more important actor, the people. Peoples lack the 
traditional sovereignty ascribed to states. Rawls identifies three critical differences 
between the two conceptions that serve to distinguish them.72 First, states typically have 
the right to wage war as a tool of statecraft, whereas peoples do not. Peoples have no 
right no wage war except in self-defence.73 Second, States typically have significant 
autonomy in dealing with its own people. Rawls's conception of peoples limits a 
government's internal sovereignty especially where it concerns human rights.7 Third, 
states lack a moral character whereas peoples have a definite moral character.75 Thus a 
state's sovereignty is limited in the ability to pursue its policy interests through war, 
oppression, discrimination, and unfair economic exploitation of other peoples. 
Thus the conception peoples is meant to distinguish the traditionally sovereign 
powers of states such as the ability to pursue a foreign policy of war and an insular 
domestic policy with the more "reasonable" interests of peoples. These interests include 
the protection of its political and geographic independence, its cultural and social 
uniqueness, as well as the security of its citizens. These interests ensure that peoples will 
develop and maintain its proper self-respect. 
Not all critics agree that Rawls succeeds in distinguishing a Peoples from a State. See Buchanan, Rawls's 
Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World p. 698-9. and Beitz, Political Theory and 
International Relations p. 672. Critics seem to suggest that Peoples are simply States (a society with a 
common culture and/or language) with limited powers of sovereignty and a stronger duty of assistance. 
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Some critics have argued that the use of peoples as the representatives who 
choose the international principles of justice is a betrayal of liberalism because it lends 
legitimacy to very inegalitarian regimes.76 If the representatives to the original position 
represent peoples and given that no single people is completely homogeneous then all 
these representatives will be representing is the interest of the official and dominant 
conception of the good or justice in society, and they will probably prejudice or disregard 
the interests of minorities or dissidents.77 Although there is much truth to the argument, it 
is not the focus here. 
In the original position, peoples are tasked to select a conception of justice that will 
be used to decide the institutional order among decent societies. The main difference 
between the two types of parties is the values they embody. In the case of citizens of a 
liberal democratic society, it is the liberty and fundamental equality of all persons that 
must be respected. However, at the international level, because of the variety of 
comprehensive doctrines that exist it would be impractical or unrealistic to demand that 
all societies embrace liberal values; in the law of peoples, Rawls believes to do so would 
show insufficient tolerance and respect for non-liberal societies. 
The problem of international political theory is that the norms of 
international conduct arising form these various political cultures may not 
coincide. The possibility of a peaceful international life, in which liberal 
societies can flourish, depends upon finding a basis on which reasonable 
and decent peoples can cooperate willingly given the international analog 
of the fact of reasonable pluralism.79 
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It is the values of liberty and equality of peoples that are considered paramount at the 
international level because Rawls claims they are more unobjectionable to non liberal 
societies. Nevertheless, any form of organization, be it a domestic society or international 
in the case of the society of peoples, is going to be held together either by force or 
common interest. Rawls's requirement that a people be reasonably just rules out the 
former. The second requirement is more of a spirit of nationality that encourages 
cooperation among its members and fosters a desire to remain under the same 
agreement.80 The last characteristic reflects a moral choice of limiting its rational desires 
in favour of working in harmony with others that have equally legitimate interest. All 
three characteristics are reflective of a liberal democratic society, but Rawls aims to show 
that they apply equally to decent non-liberal peoples as well. 
The Challenge of Stability for the Law of Peoples 
Rawls identifies two kinds of stability: stability as a balance of forces (a modus 
Vivendi) and stability for the right reasons. In the first instance, stability as a balance of 
forces is achieved in the realm of international politics through a practical means of 
addressing national interests. It is practical in the sense that it assumes states are 
primarily motivated by economic and military security rather than by ideological or 
ethical considerations. It assumes that states are the primary agents in the international 
sphere and that no superior agent or organization has the authority (although they may 
have the power) to regulate, dictate or influence multilateral relationships. The primary 
pursuit of states is national security with economic and military security being 
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paramount. In this pursuit states seek to amass resources in a global realm marked by 
scarcity. As a practical pursuit, the ideological basis of international relations is neither 
a policy guideline nor even a factor for consideration. At its most extreme form, it is an 
approach Machiavellian in nature, without regard to neither ethical considerations nor 
legal constraints. Thus, the nature of these relationships is primarily competitive rather 
than cooperative and it is a goal oriented approach limited only by practical limitations. 
Stability for the right reasons is a stability based on moral considerations and a 
sense of justice. It is developed when citizens act according to principles that follow from 
a sense of justice that grows out of participation and education in a just society.84 This is 
as true in the international realm as it is in the domestic one. The foundation of a stable 
law of peoples is based on principles that are both acceptable to liberal democratic 
societies and decent peoples. 
As a realistically Utopian idea, the law of peoples must have a parallel 
process that leads peoples, including both liberal and decent societies, to 
accept willingly and to act upon the legal norms embodied in a just law of 
peoples.85 
Much like in the domestic case, stability occurs from the continued participation 
of peoples under the law of peoples. Once people learn to honour and respect the law of 
peoples wholeheartedly, and receive in return the respect, and witness the compliance of 
other peoples, they develop a level of trust and confidence in other peoples. This is turn 
leads them to the recognition of mutual respect and the equality of all decent peoples and 
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they begin to accept the law of peoples as right conduct. If this type of stability can be 
achieved, then the law of peoples can serve as a normative standard for judging 
international institutions, law and relations and it would have achieved it without 
imposing liberal doctrine on non-liberal societies.87 In a sense, this is analogous to 
human flourishing in the domestic case. But also similarly to the domestic case the law of 
peoples also depends on the obtainment of an overlapping consensus. If such a consensus 
is absent it means that the relationship among peoples is not inherently stable. Rawls 
would not have demonstrated that the law of peoples was "universal in its reach." 
Cosmopolitanism Considered 
It seems natural to consider if it would have been less problematic to use 
individuals rather than peoples as the main actor. The law of peoples has drawn criticism 
from many liberal theorists due to Rawls's use of peoples rather than individuals as the 
primary political agent.89 Rawls chose peoples over individuals as the principal agent in 
the context of international relations primarily as a means of including other societies in 
the society of peoples based on only what they can "reasonably grant" in terms of liberal 
values and still allow them to be treated with equal respect.90 Rawls explicitly prohibits 
Here I use "right" according to Rawls's distinction between public and private reason. Public reason 
deals with issues of the right; universal in nature; in other words, things that are acceptable to all reasonable 
people, despite their comprehensive doctrines, like a prohibition against slavery. Private reason covers 
issues of the good; issues over which there may exist 'reasonable disagreement', like a prohibition against 
gay marriage. According to Rawls, public reason should be used when discussing 'basic political' matters 
and private reason deals with ethical commitments, often a result of comprehensive doctrines that specify 
conceptions of the good. p. 132 
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any conceptions of justice that may appear unreasonable to have terms of cooperation 
that are reluctantly accepted through a coercive action resulting from an inferior political, 
social or economic position.91 
Some critics argue that cosmopolitanism is a more natural development of Rawls 
domestic theory of justice. In its most basic version, cosmopolitanism is the idea that all 
of humanity is part of a single community.92 It would be a natural extension of Rawls's 
thoughts about justice at the domestic level because is ascribes the same moral rights and 
standards to all human beings. Under cosmopolitanism, all people (not peoples) are to be 
treated as free and equal. The boundaries between states, nations and peoples are 
considered morally irrelevant. 
Rawls does not argue for cosmopolitanism for the simple reason that it makes 
excessive demands on the participating societies.93 Under a purely cosmopolitan theory 
of international justice, one that seems to follow directly from Rawls's domestic 
conception, justice would require a society of peoples to look to secure the individual 
rights of each citizen. 
...by dropping the egalitarian features of justice as fairness [Rawls] seeks 
to arrive at an account of justice that has the 'greater generality' called for 
in the international setting. In short, since non-liberal societies cannot 
'reasonably be expected' to accept liberal principles of justice, even a 
liberal political conception of international justice would be unreasonable 
to insist on them. 
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Cosmopolitanism would demand that non-liberal societies "liberalize" themselves to 
become members in good standing; an exacting and upon reflection, an idealistic demand 
in the current global context. 
Despite the seemingly easy extension of his domestic conception to the 
international realm, through a demand for a cosmopolitan theory to develop the principles 
of justice among societies, Rawls reaches what he believes is a workable solution for a 
realistic Utopia by choosing peoples as the main actor when we are considering 
international relations. He rejects cosmopolitanism as an approach because he believes 
that it is tantamount to fashioning a foreign policy to "act and gradually shape all not yet 
liberal societies in a liberal direction, until eventually (in the ideal case) all societies are 
liberal". As mentioned previously the move sparked criticism because it seemingly 
eschewed liberal principles to reach a workable solution. However, even if no such 
criticism was forthcoming, it is far from uncontroversial that even decent hierarchical 
peoples would embrace the more liberal law of peoples with open arms. 
An example of the incompatibility is provided by a recent supreme court ruling in 
Turkey. Sharia, the body of Islamic religious law, the legal framework that regulates 
public and private aspects of life those Muslim countries subject to it, was found to be 
irreconcilable with the principles of democracy. For example, in 1998 the Turkish high 
court banned and dissolved the Refah Party because the court believed the laws of Sharia 
were irreconcilable with the law of democracy. The Court ruled that Sharia, 
...which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by 
religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the 
political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place 
in it...It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human 
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on Sharia, which 
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clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its 
criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women 
and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in 
accordance with religious precepts.9 
The Acceptability of Equality 
Decent peoples in a hierarchical society may have a more fundamental objection 
to the proposed principles of justice. Specifically, before these hierarchical societies 
could adopt the law of peoples for the right reasons they would have to develop a sense 
07 
of equality of persons that is most likely very foreign to them. The value of 
egalitarianism, which seems to underlie the entire concept of the law of peoples, makes it 
difficult to imagine how Rawls could successfully extend the principles of justice into 
non-liberal contexts. 
This poses a unique problem. In order for stability for the right reasons to obtain, 
the law of peoples must be accepted by non-liberal societies, not for practical reasons but 
for moral reasons. 
. ..to say that the society of democratic peoples is stable in the right way is 
to say that it is stable with respect to justice, that is, that the institutions 
and practices among peoples always more or less satisfy the relevant 
principles of justice, although social conditions are presumably always 
changing. It is further to say that the law of peoples is honoured not 
simply because of a fortunate balance of power-it being in no people's 
interest to upset it -but because, despite the possibly shifting fortunes of 
different peoples, all are moved to adhere to their common law accepting 
it as just and beneficial to all." 
Moe, Refah Revisited(2005), p. 12-13. 96 
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Furthermore, when someone holds a moral conviction, it is the result, not of expediency, 
but of a deeply held commitment. Of course Rawls distinguishes between public and 
private reason, but even in the broader category of public reason, it is not evident how 
and why a hierarchical society, organized in a ranked series of classes or castes, would be 
expected to hold deep seated moral commitments to the equality of peoples as found in 
the Law of People, when it is questionable that there is a clear divide between private and 
public reason. This calls into question the strength of the alleged overlapping consensus 
that is supposed to exist at the international level. 
The stability of the law of peoples is dependent upon the strength of an 
overlapping consensus that is not necessarily, or perhaps even likely to be, acceptable to 
non-liberal societies.100 Thus when Rawls moves from ideal to non-ideal theory, he rests 
the extension on a questionable premise, namely the moral conviction of non-liberal 
societies to an equality of peoples. If stability is to obtain for the right reasons, an 
overlapping consensus must be acceptable to all well ordered peoples. In other words, the 
basis of the international relationship among or between societies cannot be based on 
strategic or power related reasons or it risks being nothing more than a modus vivendi, a 
practical means of securing military, economic or social peace. Any of these types of 
security are invariably sought by societies, but for Rawls, if they comprise the basis for 
the relationship, then it is not an acceptable arrangement, and it is not stability for the 
right reasons. 
The challenge for Rawls is to show that these non-liberal societies would at least 
entertain upholding the law of peoples; to ask him to do more would be unreasonable. In 
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order to do so, Rawls must show how the principles may fit within the set of beliefs -
their public beliefs- which currently shape their societies. If he cannot, then the claim 
that these societies would embrace, or at least entertain, upholding the law of peoples is 
unsupported. The answer to this question lies in the use of the original position. 
The original position is considered by Rawls to be the most appropriate 
perspective from which the parties can reach an objective agreement on the laws and 
social institutions that will govern their relationships. For even if agreement were 
possible given the current state of affairs, it would assume that the existing state of affairs 
along with the concomitant bargaining advantages were valid.101 Rawls uses this 
hypothetical device to argue that the results of the negotiations would be fair to both 
liberal and non-liberal peoples. 
The ground rules for the use of the original position are that the participants need 
to be rational, reasonable, and behind a veil of ignorance. Although there may be 
legitimacy to Kok-Chor Tan's criticism that the veil of ignorance in the case of the third 
iteration of the original position that includes non-liberal societies is "thin", meaning it is 
"overly generalized and less demanding than a real liberal global theory would be", this 
is not of primary concern in this instance.102 What is of concern is the assumption that the 
acceptability of the principles of justice be reasonable and rational to both liberal and 
hierarchical societies alike. So in order for the law of peoples to be stable for the right 
reasons, Rawls must provide an account of the reasonableness of non-liberal peoples for 
the right reasons.103 
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Reasonableness means adopting fair terms of cooperation and following them 
willingly given the assurance that others will do the same. Rational agents are those that 
pursue interests that are specifically their own (but not necessarily exclusively). Rawls 
accounts for rationality by ascribing a common view of the good conception of justice, 
explaining that the parties care about the good of the peoples they represent and want to 
ensure it security from aggression. Rawls uses the concept of reasonableness in particular 
to buttress the concept of right and the ideas of fairness and a willingness to temper ones 
claims in view of the legitimate claims of others. In fact the idea of the original 
position is to subject rational decisions to reasonable moral constraints.105 
The original position is a hypothetical setting for rational parties seeking their self 
interest seeking to ensure that the principles of justice will be such as to enable them to 
pursue their own conception of the good. Our capacity for a conception of the good and 
the capacity for a sense of justice are the capacities needed to come to a reasonable 
conception of justice. As liberal democratic citizens, they see themselves as free and 
equal and despite differing comprehensive doctrines, the original position acts as a level 
playing field given the fact of reasonable pluralism.106 
Clearly the original position works for liberal peoples. The original position by 
use of the veil of ignorance models the restrictions appropriate on the reasons for 
adopting a political conception of justice. Among equals, it is reasonable to adopt the fair 
terms of cooperation and to follow them willingly, given the assurance that others will do 
the same. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 15-17. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2003), p. 128. 
Freeman, John Rawls — An Overview p. 26. 
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As complementary ideas, neither the reasonable nor the rational can stand 
without the other. Merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their 
own they wanted to advance by fair cooperation; merely rational agents 
lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the independent validity of the 
claims of others.107 
The distinction is clear, and the concepts are quite different. Rawls argues that both are 
necessary for the law of peoples just as it is for justice as fairness.108 Since the parties to 
the agreement are equally rational and equally reasonable, none can force or trick another 
into accepting principles that would benefit one over the other. Rawls reasons that just as 
the equality of persons exists intra-society, the equality of peoples exists inter-society.109 
Reasonableness in this sense however, is acceptable only to those who recognize 
the unfairness of inequality when conceiving of the principles of justice.11 This means 
that reasonableness, when considered in the context of the law of peoples, creates an 
assumption that the rational parties engaged in the original position of peoples would not 
expect unfair privilege for their peoples. This is the basis for the overlapping consensus at 
the international level for the liberal democratic peoples as well as at the domestic level 
despite varying comprehensive doctrines; and this is the basis for stability for the right 
reasons. 
The strength of Rawls's claim that hierarchical peoples would accept and support 
the law of peoples is dependent on the claim that reasonableness as defined, is acceptable 
to them. Rawls identifies two criteria necessary to consider a hierarchical peoples well 
ordered; given that he only admits decent hierarchical peoples to the original position, 
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let's examine their characteristics. The first criterion relates to the relationship among 
peoples. Decent hierarchical peoples are not aggressive towards other peoples. They 
respect the integrity of other peoples and do not seek to impose their will, as understood 
through their comprehensive doctrine, on other peoples. They do seek to influence other 
peoples they do so while respecting the political and social orders of these other 
societies.111 In other words, they are civil, peaceful, and respectful members of the 
international society of peoples. 
The second criteria relates to the internal workings of the decent hierarchical 
society. It has three parts. First, that the society is governed in accordance with a common 
ideal of justice and secures basic human rights for its members. Basic human rights 
include the right to life, which include the right to subsistence and security, the right to 
liberty, which includes freedom from arbitrary arrest, slavery, serfdom and a sufficient 
freedom of religion and thought, the right to personal property; and to fair and equal 
treatment before the law.112 No common good is achievable without first respecting the 
basic rights of citizens.113 
Second, these societies must have a common idea of justice from which members 
of the society derive their feeling of duty and obligation to adhere to its principles and 
upon which there legal system is based. This feeling of duty arises from a sense of right 
and wrong as understood in that particular society. Rawls wants to ascribe a capacity for 
acting morally and cooperatively to each member of decent hierarchical societies. 
111
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Third, Rawls explains that for a given system of law to be upheld, the 
administrators of justice must "sincerely and reasonably believe" in the society's 
common idea of justice. It does not matter that this common idea does not reflect the 
belief that all individuals are free and equal, only that they are cooperating members of 
society, recognizing their moral duties and obligations as members of the society.114 This 
means that the various minorities (or non-power-wielding majorities) are represented in 
the legal system and their opinions are considered, but their interests are not necessarily 
weighed to the same degree when public policy is determined. The ruling members 
however do justify, by their own beliefs, its laws to these groups. It also means that 
although the various members of society may not have the equal stature and influence in 
the society, they are not treated arbitrarily before the law -similar cases are treated 
similarly.115 
Rawls explains that the first of these criteria, the respect for the integrity of other 
societies, is a sufficient condition for our accepting a hierarchical society as reasonable. 
He explains that the representatives in the original position for decent hierarchical 
peoples would adopt the same principles as those adopted by liberal societies. 
...decent hierarchical peoples do not engage in aggressive war; therefore 
their representatives respect the civic order and integrity of other peoples 
and accept the symmetrical situation (the equality) of the original position 
as fair. Next, in view of the common good ideas of justice held in decent 
hierarchical societies, the representatives strive both to protect the human 
rights and the good of the people they represent and to maintain their 
security and independence. The representatives care about he benefits of 
trade and also accept the idea of assistance among peoples in time of need. 
Hence, we can say that the representatives of hierarchical societies are 
decent and rational. In view of this reasoning, we can also say that the 
members of decent hierarchical societies would accept -as you and I 
114
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would accept [as members of different decent hierarchical societies] -the 
original position as fair among peoples, and would endorse the law of 
peoples adopted by their representatives as specifying fair terms of 
political cooperation with other peoples. 116 
But respect for the integrity of other societies is more a measure of a hierarchical 
117 
society's toleration than of its reasonableness. Respect for other peoples does not by 
itself specify the fair terms of political cooperation between peoples. The description of 
these decent hierarchical societies in the Law of Peoples only describes them in terms of 
toleration and indulgence, not of reasonableness. Rawls describes them as not having 
aggressive intentions toward other societies but this not enough to show the connection 
between toleration and the fair terms of political cooperation.118 In additional to 
respecting the integrity of other peoples, these societies would also have to recognize the 
legitimacy of interests and the equality of other societies and the right to exist free of 
outside influence or intervention. Only then could we say that such a hierarchical society 
was reasonable and that the law of peoples was stable for the right reasons. 
Rawls's intention is not to restrain the aggressive intentions of societies, but to 
provide a basis for the law of peoples. The law of peoples is based on the equal 
representation of decent peoples; his third principle is "peoples are equal and are parties 
to the agreements that bind them."119 At a minimum, society's party to the law of peoples 
are entitled to equal freedom. Therefore the principles of justice that result from the 
original position must apply to each society as an equal. 
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However, a society that acknowledges the integrity of other societies, as well as 
their independence and security, does not necessarily also treat them as equals. It is 
unlikely that a society of peoples would expect less than equal respect from other 
societies but it is certainly possible that a society would expect more respect than 
others.120 First among equals, certainly that is how the U.S. views itself and its role in the 
U.N. Some would argue that the U.S. is due more consideration in terms of U.N. policy 
initiatives. To understand the difference between the external tolerance of other 
societies and the expectation of privilege for one's own, one has to look into the domestic 
policies of hierarchical societies as described by Rawls. 
Hierarchical societies are only required to have formal equality. Formal equality 
in this context means adherence to and respect for their domestic laws. This is outlined 
in the second criteria for decent hierarchical societies. Rawls explains that peoples are 
entitled to basic human rights like the right to life, the freedom from slavery, the right to 
personal property and to "formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that 
19^ 
is similar cases are to be treated similarly)" This is far from the liberal notion of 
equality of members. More to the point Rawls writes 
These rights do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious 
doctrine or philosophical doctrine of human nature. The law of peoples 
does not say, for example, that human beings are moral persons and have 
equal worth in the eyes of God; or that they have certain moral and 
intellectual powers that entitle them to these rights. To argue in these ways 
would involve religious or philosophical doctrines that many decent 
hierarchical peoples might reject as liberal or democratic, or as in some 
Costa, Human Rights and the Global Original Position p. 53. 120 
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way distinctive of Western political tradition and prejudicial to other 
cultures.124 
This kind of equality is simply adherence to the laws of the society of any decent people 
including the particular hierarchical society. It says nothing about the nature of the rules 
themselves. These rules can be significantly weighted towards a particular 
comprehensive doctrine or religion and as a result may treat those outside of these groups 
with considerable inequality. 
Rawls allows for a means of dissent. The basic structure of decent non-liberal 
peoples calls for a right to dissent and the requirement of the executive and judiciary to 
give a respectful reply and weight the complaint against the laws as interpreted by the 
judiciary.126 But clearly this right has its limits. These laws 
must admit a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience and freedom of 
religion and thought, even if these freedoms are not as extensive nor as 
equal for all members of the decent society as they are in liberal 
societies.127 
Thus hierarchical societies have a formal channel for dissent, but there is no equal 
freedom of speech. The formal requirement ensures a consistent application of the law, 
but the law itself may favour some to the detriment of others. 
Rawls does seek to protect minority groups.128 The protection of basic human 
rights only ensures that the law does not overwhelmingly favour one group to the total 
124
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exclusion of others. As a result, Rawls's specifications of formal equality eliminate the 
most abusive scenarios such as slavery.129 However, despite these protections, Rawls 
does expect the dominance of one group within the hierarchical society over all others 
and accords "legitimacy to very inegalitarian regimes." 
A decent hierarchical society's conception of the person... does not require 
acceptance of the liberal idea that person are citizens first and have equal 
basic rights as equal citizens. Rather it views persons as responsible and 
cooperating members of their respective groups. Hence, persons can 
recognize, understand, and act in accordance with their moral duties and 
obligation as members of these groups.131 
Thus it seems clear to Rawls that typically one comprehensive doctrine will enjoy greater 
privileges and liberties than all others. 
It follows then that if the internal design of the hierarchical society affords greater 
liberties and privileges for some people over others with respect to their position as a 
member of the dominant group, and that it is consistent with the legal foundation of the 
society, then the society's respect for the integrity of other societies is consistent with 
unfair terms of political cooperation in the relations among peoples.132 The 
reasonableness of such a hierarchical' society calls for a consideration of the moral 
commitments held by the citizens of these societies who accept this inequality as 
reasonable.133 These citizens are in the dominant position in society. Since Rawls grants 
these societies legitimacy, it is these citizens that are the ones to which we would ask to 
assure the acceptability of the principles and standards that govern the society. Therefore, 
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in order to assess the acceptability of a particular society as decent and well ordered, 
Rawls needs to account for the acceptability of reasonableness to citizens in the dominant 
group for moral reasons.134 
The second requirement of hierarchical societies in respect to individuals 
necessitates only a minimal conception of the person. Rawls does not call for a 
political conception of the person as free, reasonable and rational as he does for liberal 
societies. The reason being is that he wants to avoid imposing liberal standards in a non-
liberal context. The question though, is whether Rawls can account for the 
reasonableness of these privileged individuals for the right reasons. If the political system 
is inherently unfair, and some enjoy greater privilege than others, and given the 
minimally conceived concept of persons, then the only moral duties and obligations of 
these privileged ones are to adhere to political caste. 
Citizens in this position may freely recognize and accept their duties and 
obligations in performing their dominant roles, and may not expect special consideration 
for performing them. Rawls explains that in hierarchical societies, all citizens are 
responsible members who can recognize and act in accordance with their moral duties 
and obligations and play their part in social life. Since to them this would be a natural 
way of acting and an observance of the law, it is possible to believe that they would not 
expect any exceptions for their society just because it is their own when they negotiated 
Tan, Liberal Toleration (1998), p. 286-287. 
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the principles of justice in the original position. However, reasonableness requires that 
claims based on privilege be excluded.139 
When we consider the relations among people, peoples -as they appear in 
Rawls's minimum conception, namely only needing to know their role in social life -
those that were accustomed to greater privileges would rationally insist upon privileges 
for their society at the international level. The only instance where we could conceive of 
these societies accepting the condition of reasonableness is if we assume they have a deep 
commitment to the value of equality among nations.140 
Clearly Rawls does ascribe some belief in equality to hierarchical societies. But 
his account seems insufficient to explain why they would accept reasonableness for the 
right reasons either at the domestic level or at the international level. At best, we could 
conceive of them regarding other members of their dominant group as equal. However, 
because they are supposed to be following their role in society, their commitment to 
equality is based on the particular characteristics of the group in questions and the legal 
and political privileges they enjoy. For example, in some Muslim countries the privileges 
will be based on whether the Shia or the Sunni are the ruling party.141 One sect typically 
dominates the other. So when citizens in that country consider the relation among citizens 
within the society, they will think of them along those lines and award the privileges 
accordingly. So when it came turn to consider the relation among societies, as adherents 
to their roles, they would expect that they would be entitled to similar privileges. 
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Furthermore, it would be exceptional for those citizens in privileged positions to 
separate their commitment to equality of each other from their attachment to dominant 
status.143 The commitment to equality of a privileged group is not a reasonable 
assumption. There is little reason to believe they would embrace the value of equality 
outside of there privileged status. Therefore, there seems to be no clear relationship 
between the commitment to equality that the dominant groups within a hierarchical 
society have and their acceptance of reasonableness as conceived in the law of peoples 
for the relations among societies. In order for Rawls to make the assumption of the 
acceptance of reasonableness work, he must assume one additional criterion when 
describing hierarchical societies; that these societies have a deep commitment to equality 
that supersedes all positions of privilege.144 
If these hierarchical societies had such a commitment to the value of equality, 
then they would be able to separate it from the equality that all enjoy as members of the 
dominant class and from the connected political and legal privilege. Reasonableness can 
then be acceptable to them for the right reasons because it will reflect their deeper 
commitment to equality, despite the inequality of the society they presently live in. 
If this argument is sound then Rawls fails to provide an unassailable account of 
decent non-liberal societies's acceptance of equality. It is not the equality of persons 
within a society (a liberal value) that must obtain in the case of decent hierarchical 
societies. It is the equality that is presupposed at the original position that is called into 
question. This is a more fundamental equality with regard to the law of peoples. Without 
individual citizens' rights to freedom and equality in their choosing of their conceptions of the good." 
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a clear account of a non-liberal society's acceptance of equality among peoples, Rawls 
would find it difficult to claim that these non-liberal societies were reasonable. It is the 
assumption of reasonableness and not rationality that provide the objective status of the 
principles of justice derived from the original position. Of primary concern is that the 
principles resulting from the original position be reasonable and rational to both liberal 
and decent hierarchical peoples alike. 
In order for the law of peoples to be stable for the right reasons, Rawls must 
provide an acceptable explanation as to why decent hierarchical societies would adopt 
fair terms of cooperation and follow them willingly when fair for these societies and fair 
for liberal societies are arguably quite different. 
Conclusion 
There are many similarities between Rawls's conception of justice in his earlier 
works and the Law of Peoples. The law of peoples is closely related to the law of nations 
that Rawls described in A Theory of Justice. But it is better understood in contrast to the 
ideas presented in Political Liberalism. Political Liberalism is the result of a perceived 
weakness in A Theory of Justice regarding the unreasonableness of a single 
comprehensive doctrine in a liberal democratic society. It was the idea of reasonable 
pluralism that drove Rawls to develop apolitical account of liberalism that could account 
for the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, or 
conceptions of the good life, is the normal result of a liberal democratic culture and free 
institutions. Many of the peoples we disagree with in terms of comprehensive doctrines 
are reasonable, meaning fair minded, sincere, intelligent and well intentioned. They also 
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have good reasons for believing as they do, even though we might not find these reasons 
compelling. This is not a temporary situation, but a permanent feature of a liberal society. 
It is not the case for a hierarchical society, even a decent one. 
The stability of the law of peoples is founded on the values of equality and basic 
human rights. These conditions however, may run contrary to other possible conceptions 
of autonomy and stability. For justice to remain stable over time it must be willingly and 
sincerely supported by those subject to it. Since the law of peoples, unlike the law in a 
decent hierarchical society, is not the result of a single comprehensive view, it must be 
supported through moral commitments to values such as equality. 
The only way it seems possible for a group of peoples profoundly divided on 
philosophical and religious fundamentals to endorse a common political conception of 
justice to govern international relations is through an overlapping consensus. The concept 
of an overlapping consensus is supposed to answer the question of stability. Remember 
that Rawls identified two possible ways that a society, domestic or international like the 
society of peoples, could remain stable. It could be stable for the right reasons, which 
requires conformity to and acceptance of the principles of justice wholeheartedly. The 
right kind of stability involves a level of moral justification for the basic structure of 
society. The second type is a modus vivendi; it is based on concession. 
The only reason stability would obtain in the case of a modus vivendi is as long as 
the balance of power remained. As soon as one party to the agreement became dominant, 
the agreement might be abandoned. Rawls wants the stability of the law of peoples to be 
something more solid than a balance of power; he wants it to be based on an overlapping 
consensus. In order for an overlapping consensus to obtain, it must be based on values 
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found within the comprehensive doctrines of the peoples party to the agreement. In such 
a case, each people would see the principles of justice among all decent peoples as a 
component, an essential constituent part that fits into its own comprehensive doctrine. 
The problem stems from the fact that the moral commitments and convictions that 
these decent, non-liberal societies actually hold conflict with the ones they would need to 
adopt for the law of peoples. Rawls claims that the value of equality of peoples is one of 
the more acceptable values to decent non-liberal societies. But the challenge for Rawls is 
to explain how these decent hierarchical societies might develop a sense of equality that 
is most likely foreign to them. The value of equality that underlies the entire concept of 
the law of peoples is a moral conviction, not the result of expediency but of a deeply held 
commitment. 
The ground rules of the original position include the requirement that participants 
be rational and reasonable. To be reasonable means to adopt the fair terms of cooperation 
and to follow them willingly. Clearly this is not a problem for liberal democratic 
societies. Among equals, it is reasonable to adopt the fair terms of cooperation and to 
follow them willingly. If being reasonable means treating peoples as equal, then to do 
otherwise must be unreasonable. But in a society where reasonable means that some 
enjoy privileges others do not, it is hard to accept that representatives of these people in 
the original position would neither expect special consideration for their people nor rank 
themselves in importance above others. Thus, the stability to the law of peoples is 
dependent upon the strength of an overlapping consensus that is not necessarily 
acceptable to decent non-liberal societies. 
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The requirement of reasonableness calls into question commitments to equality 
and the limits of toleration and intervention. It may lead to a pervasive concern on the 
part of non-liberal societies that see these conditions, necessary for the stability of the law 
of peoples, as an indirect way for liberal societies to advance the cause of democracy, 
human rights and individual equality, all liberal values. The law of peoples is intended to 
avoid this possible source of instability. When Rawls outlines the parallel conditions of 
the society of peoples, one of the conditions is one of toleration. As a result, decent 
hierarchical peoples need not be wary of liberal intrusion. But this toleration may come at 
the expense of a genuine acceptance on the part of hierarchical peoples of the equality of 
all peoples. 
Toleration by itself is not sufficient to conclude that stability in the law of peoples 
will obtain. The limits of toleration will be marked based on the liberal conception of 
justice. Rawls explains that it is important to understand that the law of peoples is 
developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice 
for a domestic regime to a society of peoples. Thus, in developing the law of peoples with 
a liberal conception of justice he works out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy 
of a reasonably just liberal people. In a liberal society, Rawls explains that reasonable 
people think it unreasonable to use political power to repress other comprehensive 
doctrines that are reasonable yet different from their own. Furthermore, since a plurality 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is the "inevitable outcome" of human reason 
under free institutions, wide spread social agreement on a single doctrine can be achieved 
only through oppression -the oppressive use of state power. That is the case even in 
decent hierarchical societies by definition. 
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As a result, it becomes less apparent that the interests of decent non-liberal 
peoples be accommodated at the international level. Rawls fails to provide justification of 
why we should tolerate non-liberal politics at the international level. In A Theory of 
Justice he clearly argues that liberal toleration in the domestic context does not require 
the toleration of non-liberal politics. Consequently, by not offering adequate justification, 
it appears that he simply relaxes the limits of toleration in order to accommodate decent 
non-liberal peoples in the Society of Peoples. Thus, it appears Rawls's real motivation is 
to extend the law of peoples acceptance to decent non-liberal societies and that no 
ultimate values are shared. Consequently, stability is not achieved for the right reasons 
and Rawls's law of peoples is, beneath it all, a modus vivendi. 
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